Wednesday, December 27, 2006
Folded Wings
Deepest condolences go to the family of Eagle Scout and President Gerald Ford. If nothing else can be said about his his presidency, it was his character and integrity which preserved America's faith in its presidency. While President Ford sacrificed his chances for a second term through his controversial pardon of President Nixon, it was the value of character, reinforced through his years as a scout, which prevented the further erosion of public trust in his office by an increasingly-cynical American public.
If we can learn anything from the scouting program, it's that our character has to count for something. For President Ford, character was everything during his short tenure in the White House. A pair of mighty but gentle wings have indeed folded.
If we can learn anything from the scouting program, it's that our character has to count for something. For President Ford, character was everything during his short tenure in the White House. A pair of mighty but gentle wings have indeed folded.
Saturday, December 16, 2006
Less is More
John McCain and a few retired generals are advising President Bush to increase US troop strength in Baghdad by 15,000-30,000 men in order to stabilize the Iraqi capitol. That recommendation flies in the face of the Baker Commission, which urged withdrawal of US combat forces by early 2008. With such conflicting advice coming from multiple sides, the president faces a difficult choice, and the best way forward will probably be some path between the two extremes.
Since the early days of occupation, John McCain has agitated for a bigger US presence in Iraq. Early in the occupation his advice would have been relevant and effective. A large force that would secure the cities, destroy arms caches, and deter the insurgency in its initial phases would have likely diminished the intensity of the insurgency we currently recognize.
But Winter 2006 is not Spring 2003. By now the cities aren't secure (many, especially in the west, have turned into al Qaeda strongholds,) the arms caches have been dispursed, and the insurgency is widespread and self-sustaining. In this climate, the only meaningful victory will come from a long-term effort by the Iraqi government and people to quell the insurgency.
If more US forces are sent to Baghdad, the Americans will take significant casualties in exchange for a short-term but unsustainable increase in stability in Baghdad. The Iraqi forces have to be brought up to the level where they can secure Baghdad with little foreign assistance. Further, the Iraqi forces need to have a clear mandate from their government to destroy the Shiite militias which threaten to tear Iraq apart.
For America, the correct path is neather an increase nor a decrease in its total troop strength, at least not for the next six months. The Army's current challenge is to replace combat forces on a one-for-one basis with military transition teams who will show the Iraqis how to fight and give them the tools to do it. Once the correct number of transition team members have been embedded with Iraqi units, the remaining combat forces should redeploy to a small number of super-bases within Iraq. Their primary missions will include protecting US trainers from mutiny by their Iraqi counterparts, and to back the Iraqi units up if they are in danger of being overrun. The military commanders should determine how many combat forces will stay in Iraq, and they should determine an events-based formula for gradually sending troops home.
The most logical approach towards Iraq that I've heard is the Joint Chiefs' "Go Long" approach. Defeating insurgencies usually takes over a decade; with Iraq, the problem is compounded by the Shiite-Sunni animosity. The US will have to maintain a long-term presence to achieve its goals. The only way Americans will tolerate such an effort is if America maintains a smaller footprint that takes far fewer casualties than what we are taking right now. Of course, this means that Iraqi soldiers and police will take more casualties as they are given a greater share of the counterinsurgency burden. The harsh reality of warfare is that new military units are forged in the crucible of combat. If Iraqis are worthy of freedom, they will make great sacrifices to defend it. If they fail to rise to the challenge, the Iraqis will be worthy only of the dictatorship that the US cast off nearly four years ago.
Since the early days of occupation, John McCain has agitated for a bigger US presence in Iraq. Early in the occupation his advice would have been relevant and effective. A large force that would secure the cities, destroy arms caches, and deter the insurgency in its initial phases would have likely diminished the intensity of the insurgency we currently recognize.
But Winter 2006 is not Spring 2003. By now the cities aren't secure (many, especially in the west, have turned into al Qaeda strongholds,) the arms caches have been dispursed, and the insurgency is widespread and self-sustaining. In this climate, the only meaningful victory will come from a long-term effort by the Iraqi government and people to quell the insurgency.
If more US forces are sent to Baghdad, the Americans will take significant casualties in exchange for a short-term but unsustainable increase in stability in Baghdad. The Iraqi forces have to be brought up to the level where they can secure Baghdad with little foreign assistance. Further, the Iraqi forces need to have a clear mandate from their government to destroy the Shiite militias which threaten to tear Iraq apart.
For America, the correct path is neather an increase nor a decrease in its total troop strength, at least not for the next six months. The Army's current challenge is to replace combat forces on a one-for-one basis with military transition teams who will show the Iraqis how to fight and give them the tools to do it. Once the correct number of transition team members have been embedded with Iraqi units, the remaining combat forces should redeploy to a small number of super-bases within Iraq. Their primary missions will include protecting US trainers from mutiny by their Iraqi counterparts, and to back the Iraqi units up if they are in danger of being overrun. The military commanders should determine how many combat forces will stay in Iraq, and they should determine an events-based formula for gradually sending troops home.
The most logical approach towards Iraq that I've heard is the Joint Chiefs' "Go Long" approach. Defeating insurgencies usually takes over a decade; with Iraq, the problem is compounded by the Shiite-Sunni animosity. The US will have to maintain a long-term presence to achieve its goals. The only way Americans will tolerate such an effort is if America maintains a smaller footprint that takes far fewer casualties than what we are taking right now. Of course, this means that Iraqi soldiers and police will take more casualties as they are given a greater share of the counterinsurgency burden. The harsh reality of warfare is that new military units are forged in the crucible of combat. If Iraqis are worthy of freedom, they will make great sacrifices to defend it. If they fail to rise to the challenge, the Iraqis will be worthy only of the dictatorship that the US cast off nearly four years ago.
Friday, December 08, 2006
Divide and Conquer
Controversially, the Baker commission wants the US Government to negotiate with Iran and Syria over the future of Iraq. Many Americans, mostly on the political right, do not want to see this happen. Even James Baker has expressed a skepticism that Iran will make any compromise, and that the goal of such negotiations is to expose Iran as the bad actor it currently is.
There actually is a window of opportunity for the US in these negotiations. History has consistenly shown that the US gets into trouble when it unifies America's enemies instead of pitting those enemies against each other. Such is the current situation with Iran and Syria. While both nations are making heaps of trouble for the US in Iraq, there are fundamental differences between Iran and Syria. While both nations support Hezbollah in Lebanon, they have differing strategies in Iraq. The Iranians want a Shiite theocratic government that will be friendly towards Iran. The Syrians want a secular Sunni government (read: restored Ba'ath Party) that will be friendly with Syria (in the mold of the detente between Saddam Hussein and Bashar Assad that existed in 2000-2003.) If the US must choose between the two, the Baathists represent the lesser of two evils.
A possible compromise with Syria would see greater Sunni empowerment in the Iraqi government, especially the inclusion of former Ba'athists and amnesty for Baathist insurgents. In return, Syria would capture the Iraqi insurgent leadership (former members of Saddam's regime who are now in Syria) under house arrest and cut off insurgent funding.
Like James Baker, I'm under no illusions about Iran, and there should be no compromise that allows for Shiite theocracy or an empowered Moqtada al Sadr. I believe that Iran can only be brought to heel if we sponsor our own insurgency by Iranian dissidents against their government. At the same time, if Ba'athists can be re-integrated into Iraqi society, they can form a formidable fighting force that will slaughter the followers of Moqtada al Sadr, just as Saddam killed Moqtada's old man.
America's history is filled with examples when our policy mistakes failed to capitalize on rifts between our enemies. In 1940 we should have encouraged war between Japan and Russia instead of waiting to be attacked by Japan. In 1945 we forced Chiang Kai-Shek to make peace with Mao Zedong's Communists when Mao was against the ropes. Our fight for Vietnam strengthened the Vietnamese Communists' strained relations with Russia and China. We failed to prolong the Iran-Iraq War back when continued war was in America's interest, and our containment of Saddam motivated al Qaeda to take its anger out on the US instead of Saddam Hussein. America should more often take the position that then-Senator Harry Truman took when Germany invaded the Soviet Union: let's make sure they both lose.
There actually is a window of opportunity for the US in these negotiations. History has consistenly shown that the US gets into trouble when it unifies America's enemies instead of pitting those enemies against each other. Such is the current situation with Iran and Syria. While both nations are making heaps of trouble for the US in Iraq, there are fundamental differences between Iran and Syria. While both nations support Hezbollah in Lebanon, they have differing strategies in Iraq. The Iranians want a Shiite theocratic government that will be friendly towards Iran. The Syrians want a secular Sunni government (read: restored Ba'ath Party) that will be friendly with Syria (in the mold of the detente between Saddam Hussein and Bashar Assad that existed in 2000-2003.) If the US must choose between the two, the Baathists represent the lesser of two evils.
A possible compromise with Syria would see greater Sunni empowerment in the Iraqi government, especially the inclusion of former Ba'athists and amnesty for Baathist insurgents. In return, Syria would capture the Iraqi insurgent leadership (former members of Saddam's regime who are now in Syria) under house arrest and cut off insurgent funding.
Like James Baker, I'm under no illusions about Iran, and there should be no compromise that allows for Shiite theocracy or an empowered Moqtada al Sadr. I believe that Iran can only be brought to heel if we sponsor our own insurgency by Iranian dissidents against their government. At the same time, if Ba'athists can be re-integrated into Iraqi society, they can form a formidable fighting force that will slaughter the followers of Moqtada al Sadr, just as Saddam killed Moqtada's old man.
America's history is filled with examples when our policy mistakes failed to capitalize on rifts between our enemies. In 1940 we should have encouraged war between Japan and Russia instead of waiting to be attacked by Japan. In 1945 we forced Chiang Kai-Shek to make peace with Mao Zedong's Communists when Mao was against the ropes. Our fight for Vietnam strengthened the Vietnamese Communists' strained relations with Russia and China. We failed to prolong the Iran-Iraq War back when continued war was in America's interest, and our containment of Saddam motivated al Qaeda to take its anger out on the US instead of Saddam Hussein. America should more often take the position that then-Senator Harry Truman took when Germany invaded the Soviet Union: let's make sure they both lose.
Wednesday, December 06, 2006
Two Months Late and an Election Short
In hindsight, the timing to today's Iraq Study Group report couldn't have been worse for the Bush Administration. Initially, I believe that the White House wanted to push the report past the elections, out of fear that it would have damaged Republican chances for retaining Congress. Instead, it appears that delaying the report hurt Republicans.
When Donald Rumsfeld resigned on the day after the disastrous election, Republican legislators cried foul and complained that, had Bush made such a move shortly before the election, they wouldn't have suffered grave losses at the polls. The Iraq Study Group report was the same way, although most Republicans aren't saying that just yet.
Americans want to see a way forward in Iraq, and they do not want a repeat of post-Soviet Afghanistan. While Democrats never offered a consistent plan, voters grew tired of a Republican plan (stay the course) that wasn't producing visible results. The Iraq Study Group's report would have given Republicans a new plan, and showed confidence that the administration would be flexible enough to change tactics (and I do expect the administration to support most of the panel's recommendations.) It would have also given President Bush an expedient way of replacing Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates, as a means of finding a new Defense Secretary who was more capable of implementing the new strategy.
While the report's frank and dire conclusions may have initially hurt the Republicans, the damage was already done in Bob Woodward's book State of Denial and the media blitz that followed. While the book contained a lot of unsubstantiated charges (like claims that the Pentagon was understating attacks against US forces,) uncritical media parroting of the book reinforced voter concerns about Iraq.
While I think the ISG report released, say, a month or two before elections would have helped Republicans, the damage had already been done by a series of scandals that were exposed the previous year. The scandals actually ranked ahead of Iraq in exit polls of why a majority of voters broke for the Democrats. It's not like the Democrats have any moral high ground to stand on in accusing Republicans of corruption, but the GOP and the media made a soft response to the corruption that follwed prominent Dems like Harry Reid and William Jefferson. Top House Republican Dennis Hastert even made the audacious statement that Jefferson should be immune from an FBI search! Apparently when it comes to Congressional corruption, birds of a feather flock together.
The ISG report should expose Karl Rove as being far less capable a strategist as the Dems give him credit for. Here is the plan that Republicans needed to placate voters (at least for the time being,) and it comes over a month after the election!
Nevertheless, the ISG report should rise above the level of partisan politics. It needs to forge a national concensus on the way forward towards restoring some degree of stability in the Middle East. Iraq has been a political football for far too long. It's high time for the President and Congress to takle the real issues in Iraq instead of fragging themselves.
When Donald Rumsfeld resigned on the day after the disastrous election, Republican legislators cried foul and complained that, had Bush made such a move shortly before the election, they wouldn't have suffered grave losses at the polls. The Iraq Study Group report was the same way, although most Republicans aren't saying that just yet.
Americans want to see a way forward in Iraq, and they do not want a repeat of post-Soviet Afghanistan. While Democrats never offered a consistent plan, voters grew tired of a Republican plan (stay the course) that wasn't producing visible results. The Iraq Study Group's report would have given Republicans a new plan, and showed confidence that the administration would be flexible enough to change tactics (and I do expect the administration to support most of the panel's recommendations.) It would have also given President Bush an expedient way of replacing Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates, as a means of finding a new Defense Secretary who was more capable of implementing the new strategy.
While the report's frank and dire conclusions may have initially hurt the Republicans, the damage was already done in Bob Woodward's book State of Denial and the media blitz that followed. While the book contained a lot of unsubstantiated charges (like claims that the Pentagon was understating attacks against US forces,) uncritical media parroting of the book reinforced voter concerns about Iraq.
While I think the ISG report released, say, a month or two before elections would have helped Republicans, the damage had already been done by a series of scandals that were exposed the previous year. The scandals actually ranked ahead of Iraq in exit polls of why a majority of voters broke for the Democrats. It's not like the Democrats have any moral high ground to stand on in accusing Republicans of corruption, but the GOP and the media made a soft response to the corruption that follwed prominent Dems like Harry Reid and William Jefferson. Top House Republican Dennis Hastert even made the audacious statement that Jefferson should be immune from an FBI search! Apparently when it comes to Congressional corruption, birds of a feather flock together.
The ISG report should expose Karl Rove as being far less capable a strategist as the Dems give him credit for. Here is the plan that Republicans needed to placate voters (at least for the time being,) and it comes over a month after the election!
Nevertheless, the ISG report should rise above the level of partisan politics. It needs to forge a national concensus on the way forward towards restoring some degree of stability in the Middle East. Iraq has been a political football for far too long. It's high time for the President and Congress to takle the real issues in Iraq instead of fragging themselves.
