Monday, November 14, 2005
Crossing Over Iraq, with John Edwards
Former Veep candidate John Edwards, currently out of politics but still wielding considerable influence within the Democratic party, is using the WaPo editorial page to weigh in on Iraq. The thing I like about Edwards is that, unlike his party chair Howard Dean, he is not totally devoid of good ideas. Still, he's too cozy with the radical left for my tastes.
Edwards gets off to a mixed start. He takes some responsibility for his vote on Iraq (something that a lot of left-wingers ignored about Kerry and Edwards in 2004,) but then lays the blame at the feet of the President. Personally, I'm getting tired of the "Bush lied, people died" meme. It was the same position adopted for the eight years of Bill Clinton, and it was enough to justify two no-fly zones, thousands of airstrikes, and 12 years of economic sanctions. The root of the problem is that Saddam had lost all credibility, and no amount of evidence would have convinved the western world that Saddam would voluntarily disarm.
The strength of Edwards's argument lies in his calls for training benchmarks and proportional withdrawals. We do need to do a better job convincing Iraqis that we won't be staying forever. After the election, we should turn at least one southern province over to the Iraqis as a token of good will; following that, we should give back more provinces as the Iraqi army's proficiency dictates.
He's also right-on regarding the diplomatic angle. We have to acknowledge Syria's ability to control the flow of money and arms into Iraq, and we will have to make hard concessions for the greater good of placating the Syrians and capturing the Baathist remnants. We will also need to make political compromises with the nationalist elements of the insurgency, perhaps including a blanket amnesty.
Still, Edwards displays a lack of understanding regarding the military situation in Iraq by suggesting that we allow the guard and reserves to stay in Iraq. The guard is bearing a disproportionate amount of the casualties, and their absence from home places a drain on the social structure and economy of America. If anything, the guard should be sent home first. It should be elite, active-duty forces who stay behind to fight the hardcore Islamists in western Iraq.
John Edwards throws another sop to the radical left by conjering up the demon of Halliburton and linking it to "American imperialism." While Halliburton and its KBR subsidiary have done plenty of business in Iraq, the contracting rules have been written to favor Iraqi firms first and foremost. Halliburton does make a lot of money supporting the US presence in Iraq, and it also performs many services that few other firms are qualified to do (especially with regards to the country's oil industry.) Democrats do this nation a great disservice by misrepresenting the nature of Halliburton's work in Iraq.
Perhaps the biggest disservice done by Democrats (without singling out Mr. Edwards) is the chorus calling for a withdrawal timetable and an exit strategy. A predictable withdrawal is a timeline for failure. Even worse, by suggesting such a timetable, the Democrats are undermining any diplomatic leverage we might have had with the nationalist elements of the insurgency. The common theme sought by all of these insurgent groups is that they want a timetable for withdrawal, and they know that they have the support of congressional Democrats in making this demand. I doubt that the "proportional withdrawal" that I support will suffice for these emboldened militants.
The government needs to do a better job supporting the troops, in spite of their rhetoric to the contrary. The White House needs to do a better job in pushing for diplomatic progress and convincing Iraqis that our goals are noble and our presence is temporary. Congressional Democrats should quit emboldening the insurgents who kill our troops on a daily basis.
Edwards gets off to a mixed start. He takes some responsibility for his vote on Iraq (something that a lot of left-wingers ignored about Kerry and Edwards in 2004,) but then lays the blame at the feet of the President. Personally, I'm getting tired of the "Bush lied, people died" meme. It was the same position adopted for the eight years of Bill Clinton, and it was enough to justify two no-fly zones, thousands of airstrikes, and 12 years of economic sanctions. The root of the problem is that Saddam had lost all credibility, and no amount of evidence would have convinved the western world that Saddam would voluntarily disarm.
The strength of Edwards's argument lies in his calls for training benchmarks and proportional withdrawals. We do need to do a better job convincing Iraqis that we won't be staying forever. After the election, we should turn at least one southern province over to the Iraqis as a token of good will; following that, we should give back more provinces as the Iraqi army's proficiency dictates.
He's also right-on regarding the diplomatic angle. We have to acknowledge Syria's ability to control the flow of money and arms into Iraq, and we will have to make hard concessions for the greater good of placating the Syrians and capturing the Baathist remnants. We will also need to make political compromises with the nationalist elements of the insurgency, perhaps including a blanket amnesty.
Still, Edwards displays a lack of understanding regarding the military situation in Iraq by suggesting that we allow the guard and reserves to stay in Iraq. The guard is bearing a disproportionate amount of the casualties, and their absence from home places a drain on the social structure and economy of America. If anything, the guard should be sent home first. It should be elite, active-duty forces who stay behind to fight the hardcore Islamists in western Iraq.
John Edwards throws another sop to the radical left by conjering up the demon of Halliburton and linking it to "American imperialism." While Halliburton and its KBR subsidiary have done plenty of business in Iraq, the contracting rules have been written to favor Iraqi firms first and foremost. Halliburton does make a lot of money supporting the US presence in Iraq, and it also performs many services that few other firms are qualified to do (especially with regards to the country's oil industry.) Democrats do this nation a great disservice by misrepresenting the nature of Halliburton's work in Iraq.
Perhaps the biggest disservice done by Democrats (without singling out Mr. Edwards) is the chorus calling for a withdrawal timetable and an exit strategy. A predictable withdrawal is a timeline for failure. Even worse, by suggesting such a timetable, the Democrats are undermining any diplomatic leverage we might have had with the nationalist elements of the insurgency. The common theme sought by all of these insurgent groups is that they want a timetable for withdrawal, and they know that they have the support of congressional Democrats in making this demand. I doubt that the "proportional withdrawal" that I support will suffice for these emboldened militants.
The government needs to do a better job supporting the troops, in spite of their rhetoric to the contrary. The White House needs to do a better job in pushing for diplomatic progress and convincing Iraqis that our goals are noble and our presence is temporary. Congressional Democrats should quit emboldening the insurgents who kill our troops on a daily basis.
Saturday, November 12, 2005
The Death of Izzat Ibrahim al Douri
If the announcement is true, may he burn in the flames of Hell for all eternity...
The announcement of Izzat Ibrahim's death should be treated with an extreme deal of skepticism, as we've heard numerous false reports of his capture and his state of health. We've also heard differing stories of his relationship with the insurgency and militant Islam. If true, his death will probably not make a noticable dent on the insurgency. While the insurgency has drawn its strategic direction and funding from former regime leaders like Izzat Ibrahim, it's also been claimed that Izzat Ibrahim had fallen out of favor with the insurgency several months ago.
It should not be forgotten amongst Americans that Izzat Ibrahim was responsible for the radicalization of Iraq's Sunnis over 10 years before we invaded.
In 1993 the regime embarked on the Return to Faith Campaign (al-Hamlah al-Imaniyyah), under the direction of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs monitored places of worship, appointed the clergy, approved the building and repair of all places of worship, and approved the publication of all religious literature. The Imam (Faith) Campaign allowed Sunni mosques more freedom in practicing religious ceremonies and rites, which reduced substantially the opposition to the regime amongst Sunni Islamists. Forces from the Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), General Security (Amn al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the Ba'ath Party killed senior Shi'a clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 civil uprising), arrested tens of thousands of Shi'a, interfered with Shi'a religious education, prevented Shi'a adherents from performing their religious rites, and fired upon or arrested Shi'a who sought to take part in their religious processions. Security agents were reportedly stationed at all the major Shi'a mosques and shrines and searched, harassed, and arbitrarily arrested worshipers.
Source: GlobalSecurity.org
To claim that our invasion radicalized Iraqis is to ignore everything we knew prior to invading Iraq (although it makes for good fodder amongst the anti-war movement.)
If anything, I'm more disappointed that Izzat Ibrahim died before we could capture him alive. Media reports from October 2004 linked him to the execution of missing pilot Scott Speicher. The fugitives from Saddam's inner circle are the last good chance we have of solving the mystery. That essential shred of truth was worth the sparing of Izzat Ibrahim's detestable life.
The announcement of Izzat Ibrahim's death should be treated with an extreme deal of skepticism, as we've heard numerous false reports of his capture and his state of health. We've also heard differing stories of his relationship with the insurgency and militant Islam. If true, his death will probably not make a noticable dent on the insurgency. While the insurgency has drawn its strategic direction and funding from former regime leaders like Izzat Ibrahim, it's also been claimed that Izzat Ibrahim had fallen out of favor with the insurgency several months ago.
It should not be forgotten amongst Americans that Izzat Ibrahim was responsible for the radicalization of Iraq's Sunnis over 10 years before we invaded.
In 1993 the regime embarked on the Return to Faith Campaign (al-Hamlah al-Imaniyyah), under the direction of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs monitored places of worship, appointed the clergy, approved the building and repair of all places of worship, and approved the publication of all religious literature. The Imam (Faith) Campaign allowed Sunni mosques more freedom in practicing religious ceremonies and rites, which reduced substantially the opposition to the regime amongst Sunni Islamists. Forces from the Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), General Security (Amn al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the Ba'ath Party killed senior Shi'a clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 civil uprising), arrested tens of thousands of Shi'a, interfered with Shi'a religious education, prevented Shi'a adherents from performing their religious rites, and fired upon or arrested Shi'a who sought to take part in their religious processions. Security agents were reportedly stationed at all the major Shi'a mosques and shrines and searched, harassed, and arbitrarily arrested worshipers.
Source: GlobalSecurity.org
To claim that our invasion radicalized Iraqis is to ignore everything we knew prior to invading Iraq (although it makes for good fodder amongst the anti-war movement.)
If anything, I'm more disappointed that Izzat Ibrahim died before we could capture him alive. Media reports from October 2004 linked him to the execution of missing pilot Scott Speicher. The fugitives from Saddam's inner circle are the last good chance we have of solving the mystery. That essential shred of truth was worth the sparing of Izzat Ibrahim's detestable life.
